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Abstract
This paper focuses on how education costs affect the political determination of redistribution
policy via individual decision making on education. For cases of high costs, there are
multiple equilibria: the poor-majority equilibrium featured by the minority of highly educated
individuals and a high level of redistribution, and the rich-majority equilibrium featured by
the majority of highly educated individuals and a low level of redistribution. For cases of low
costs, there is a unique rich-majority equilibrium featured by the majority of highly educated
individuals and a high level of redistribution.
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Expectations about future redistribution policy aﬀect the current individuals’ decision
making on educational investment, which, in turn, has an eﬀect on the future distribution
of income and, thus, on the future voting behavior over redistribution policy. Hassler
et al. (2003) and Hassler et al. (2007) have provided politico-economic frameworks
that incorporate this feedback mechanism and have shown that the mechanism results in
multiple political equilibria: the poor-majority state, and the rich-majority state. In the
poor-majority state, expectations of higher future redistribution lead to lower educational
investments and, thus, to a lower proportion of highly educated individuals. This implies a
larger size of poor individuals, which, in turn, increases future demand for redistribution,
resulting in a higher level of redistribution. In the rich-majority state, expectations of
lower future redistribution lead to higher educational investments and, thus, to a higher
proportion of highly educated individuals. This implies a larger size of rich individuals,
which, in turn, decreases future demand for redistribution, resulting in a lower level of
redistribution.
Based on this feedback mechanism, Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler et al. (2007) show
that, depending on parameter values, the economy attains one of the following two types
of equilibria: a unique poor-majority equilibrium, or multiple equilibria. Hassler et al.
(2003) assume age-independent taxation that creates dynamic motion of redistribution,
and they provide dynamic predictions of redistribution policies. The case of a unique
poor-majority equilibrium provides an explanation for continental European countries
after the oil shock, whereas the case of multiple equilibria provides an explanation for
Anglo-Saxon countries that experienced a switch from a poor-majority equilibrium to a
rich-majority equilibrium after the 1980s. In contrast, Hassler et al. (2007) assume age-
dependent taxation that produces stationary redistribution policy. Focusing on the case
of multiple equilibria, they provide an explanation for the cross-country diﬀerences in
redistribution policies among western countries that share similar political backgrounds.
The theory of Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler et al. (2007) contributes to the un-
derstanding of the diﬀerences with respect to redistribution policies between some OECD
countries. However, their theory does not fully explain the empirical observation in Nordic
countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) that have experienced high gradua-
tion rates of tertiary education (OECD, 2005) and high levels of redistribution (OECD,
2007). Furthermore, empirical observations indicate that these features in the Nordic
countries have been persistent for the last few decades. The aim of this paper is to de-
velop a framework that provides a prediction of a persistent state featured by a high
proportion of educated people and a high level of redistribution.
For the purpose of analysis, we focus on education costs in the model of Hassler et
al. (2007) and extend their model by generalizing the education cost function. Hassler et
al. (2007) assumed that the cost of investment in education e is given by (e)2, whereas
we assume that it is given by ´ ¢ (e)2, where ´ > 0. For cases of high values of ´, with
Hassler et al. (2007) (´ = 1) as a special case, individuals have a weak incentive to
invest in education, which results in a similar equilibrium characterization to Hassler
et al. (2007); the economy attains the poor-majority equilibrium or the rich-majority
equilibrium depending on expectations by individuals. However, for cases of low values
of ´, individuals have a strong incentive to invest in education even if they expect a high
1future tax rate and, thus, a low return from the investment. Therefore, for cases of low
education costs, the economy attains a rich-majority equilibrium that is featured by a
large proportion of highly educated individuals and a high level of redistribution. The
generalization of the education cost function creates a new prediction, which was not
presented by Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler et al. (2007).
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
characterizes the political equilibrium. Section 4 explores empirical implications of our
results.
2 The Model
The model is based on that developed by Hassler et al. (2007). Time is discrete and is
denoted by t = 1;2;¢¢¢ : The economy consists of a continuum of agents living for two
periods. Each generation has a unit mass. Agents are, at birth, identical.
Agents can aﬀect their prospects in life by an educational investment. In particular,
they become either rich or poor and, by undertaking a costly investment, can increase
the probability e of becoming rich. The cost of investment is given by ´ ¢ (e)2; ´ > 0;
Hassler et al. (2007) considered the special case of ´ = 1. Rich agents earn a high wage,
normalized to unity, in both periods, whereas poor agents earn a low wage, normalized
to zero.
The government provides transfers (s) ﬁnanced by taxes levied on the rich. The tax
rates are age dependent, ¿o for the old and ¿y for the young. The tax rates are determined
before the young agents decide on their investment. The government budget balances in
every period.
There is no storage technology in this economy. Each individual uses up his/her
endowments within a period. Therefore, the expected utility of agents alive at time t is
given as follows: V os
t = 1¡¿o
t +st; V ou






¯st+1) ¡ ´(et)2, where V os
t and V ou
t denote the utility of the old who were successful in
youth and the old who were unsuccessful in youth, and V
y
t denotes the expected utility of
young agents born in period t. Note that V
y
t is computed prior to an individual’s success
or failure. The parameter ¯ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor.














Because young agents are identical ex ante, agents of the same cohort choose the same
investment, implying that the proportion of old poor agents in period t + 1 is given by:













Thus, the proportion of the old poor agents in period t + 1, ut+1, depends on the income
tax rate levied on the young rich in period t; ¿
y
t , and the tax rate levied on the old rich
in period t + 1, ¿o
t+1.
The government runs a balanced budget in every period, implying that the budget
can be expressed as:
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t is the tax revenue ﬁnanced by the young.
3 Political Equilibrium
This section characterizes a political equilibrium where agents vote on taxation, period
by period. Following Hassler et al. (2007), it is assumed that agents vote on current taxes
at the beginning of each period but that only the old vote. The respective utility of the
old rich and the old poor can be written as:
V
os
































The current paper focuses on stationary Markov-perfect equilibria, where the state
of the economy is summarized by the proportion of the current old poor agents (ut).
A (stationary Markov-perfect) political equilibrium is deﬁned as a triplet of functions
fT o;T y;Ug, where T o : [0;1] ! [0;1] and T y : [0;1] £ [0;1] ! [0;1] are two public
policy rules, ¿o
t = T o(ut) and ¿
y
t = T y, and U : [0;1] ! [0;1] is a private decision rule,
ut+1 = U(¿
y
t ), such that the following functional equations hold.
1. T o(ut) = argmax¿o










t ) if ut · 1=2;
1
2W(ut;¿o
t ) if ut > 1=2:
2. U(¿
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t+1 = T o(U(¿
y
t )):





t+1) subject to ¿o
t+1 = T o(U(¿
y
t )):
The ﬁrst equilibrium condition requires that ¿o
t maximizes the utility of the decisive
old voter who is either the old rich (if ut · 1=2) or the old poor (if ut > 1=2). We assume
that the rich decide ¿o
t in the case of an equal number of rich and poor voters (ut = 1=2).




t+1, and that agents hold rational expectations about future taxes
and distributions of types. The third equilibrium condition requires that ¿
y
t is chosen to
maximize the revenue from the young.
3.1 The Determination of To and U
We now solve the three equilibrium conditions recursively. The mapping T o(¢) that sat-




0 if ut · 1=2,
1 if ut > 1=2. (3)
The decisive voter will set ¿o
t = 0 if the rich are the majority: ut · 1=2, whereas it will
set ¿o
t = 1 if the poor are the majority: ut > 1=2.
















Because T o(¢) 2 f0;1g is given by (3), any solution of (4) must be a combination of the two
linear functions: U(¿
y
t ) = (2´ ¡ (1 + ¯) + ¿
y
t )=2´ if T o = 0 and U(¿
y
t ) = (2´ ¡ 1 + ¿
y
t )=2´
if T o = 1.
Under the assumption of rational expectations about future taxes and distributions of
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Suppose that young agents in period t expect ¿o
t+1 = 0 (¿o
t+1 = 1); the rich (poor) old
are the majority of voters in period t + 1. Under this expectation, young agents choose




t ;1)). This expectation is rational if e¤(¿
y
t ;0) ¸ 1=2 (if
e¤(¿
y
t ;1) < 1=2), i.e., if ¿
y
t · 1¡´+¯ (if 1¡´ < ¿
y
t ). Figure 1 illustrates possible cases of
U that satisfy the second equilibrium condition (5). Since our focus is on the educational
costs, these cases are classiﬁed according to the size of ´.
Suppose that the costs of education are high such that ´ > 1 (see Panels (a) and
(b) of Figure 1). A high ´ implies that educational investment is costly, thereby giving
individuals a disincentive to invest in education. Thus, a high ´ results in a low proba-
bility of being successful and the majority in the next period can be poor 8¿
y
t 2 [0;1].
Alternatively, suppose that the costs of education are low such that ´ 2 (0;1] (see Panels
(c) and (d) of Figure 1). The individuals have a strong incentive to invest in education,
which results in a high probability of being successful. Thus, the majority in the next
period can be rich for ¿
y
t 2 [0;min(1¡´+¯;1)]: In particular, if ¿
y
t · 1¡´, the majority
in the next period is always the rich.1
As depicted in Figure 1, there are multiple, self-fulﬁlling expectations of U for a
certain set of ¿
y
t . Which U arises in equilibrium depends on the expectations of agents.
To illustrate U in equilibrium, we deﬁne the critical rate of ¿
y
t : µ 2 (max(0;1¡´);min(1¡
´ + ¯;1)]: The rate µ, which depends on the expectations of agents, is the highest tax
rate that yields a majority of old rich in the next period. For ¿
y
t > µ, the majority is the
poor. However, for ¿
y
t · µ, the majority in the next period is either the rich or the poor
depending on the expectations by agents. Thus, the equilibrium features a monotonic or
a nonmonotonic function U: Without loss of generality, we hereafter focus our attention
on equilibria that feature a monotonic function U (see Figure 2 for an example). The





(2´ ¡ (1 + ¯) + ¿
y
t )=2´ if ¿
y
t · µ;
(2´ ¡ 1 + ¿
y
t )=2´ if ¿
y
t > µ: (6)
1Hassler et al. (2007) ignored the cases displayed in Panels (c) and (d) by assuming a speciﬁc form
of the education cost function with ´ = 1: If ´ = 1, there is no ¿
y
t 2 [0;1] that satisﬁes ¿
y
t · 1 ¡ ´; there
is no case in which the majority, in the next period, is always the rich. Their analysis was, therefore,
limited to the cases illustrated in Panels (a) and (b). The current paper extends the model of Hassler
et al. (2007) by generalizing the cost function of education, and shows that, in the cases presented in
Panels (c) and (d), there is a political equilibrium whose outcome is qualitatively diﬀerent from that of
Hassler et al. (2007).
43.2 The Determination of Ty and the Characterization of Polit-
ical Equilibria
Given the characterization of T o and U satisfying equilibrium conditions 1 and 2, re-
spectively, we now consider the political determination of ¿
y
t that satisﬁes equilibrium
condition 3. Because there are two possible cases of the majority, we introduce the
corresponding deﬁnitions of political equilibria: a poor-majority equilibrium featured by
u > 1=2, and a rich-majority equilibrium featured by u · 1=2.
We ﬁrst show the two types of equilibria that correspond to those shown in Hassler
et al. (2007). The ﬁrst (second) part of the following proposition includes the result of
Proposition 2 (Proposition 3) in Hassler et al. (2007) as a special case. Therefore, we
leave out the interpretation of the following proposition.2
Proposition 1.
(i) Suppose that ¯ < (´ ¡ 1=2)2=(1 ¡ ´) holds. There exists a set of poor-majority
equilibria such that 8t, T o(ut) is given by (3), T y = 1=2; and U is given by (6). The
equilibrium outcome is unique and such that 8t; ¿
y
t = 1=2;¿o
t = 1; ut = 1 ¡ 1=4´,
and 2st = 3=8´.
(ii) Suppose that ¯ > 1 ¡ 2´ and ¯ ¸ (1=´)(´ ¡ 1=2)2 hold. There exists a set of rich-
majority equilibria such that 8t, T o(ut) is given by (3),
T y = µ 2
³
max(1 ¡ ´; ˜ µ(¯));min((1 + ¯)=2;1 + ¯ ¡ ´)
i
; and U is given by (6),
where ˜ µ(¯) ´
³




=2. The equilibrium outcome is indeterminate
and such that 8t, ¿
y
t = µ;¿o
t = 0; ut = (2´¡(1+¯)+µ)=2´, and 2st = (1¡µ+¯)2=2´.
Proof. See the appendix.
The second part of Proposition 1 suggests that, in the rich-majority equilibrium: (i)
the decisive voters fail to attain the top of the Laﬀer curve Z(¿
y
t ;0); and (ii) the outcome is
indeterminate. We ﬁnd that these properties depend on the speciﬁcation of the education
cost function. Indeed, the following proposition shows that when, costs are low, there is a
rich-majority equilibrium where: (i) the decisive voters attain the top of the Laﬀer curve;
and (ii) the outcome is determinate.
Proposition 2. Suppose that ¯ · 1 ¡ 2´ holds. There exists a set of rich-majority
equilibria such that 8t, T o(ut) is given by (3), T y = (1 + ¯)=2; and U is given by
(6). The equilibrium outcome is unique and such that 8t; ¿
y
t = (1 + ¯)=2;¿o
t = 0;
ut = (2´ ¡ (1 + ¯)=2)=2´, and 2st = (1 + ¯)2=8´.
Proof. See the appendix.
In order to understand the result, consider the cases illustrated in Panels (c) and (d)
of Figure 1. If 1 ¡ ´ < (1 + ¯)=2, i.e., if ¯ > 1 ¡ 2´, agents have an option that induces
a future majority of rich by setting ¿
y
t = µ. The tax rate on the young depends on the
expectations by agents (see Panel (a) of Figure 3). However, if (1 + ¯)=2 · 1 ¡ ´; i.e.,
if ¯ · 1 ¡ 2´, expectations no longer aﬀect the determination of ¿
y
t . Voters can choose
2The full version of this paper (Arawatari and Ono, 2007) provides the interpretation in detail.
5¿
y
t = (1 + ¯)=2 and maximize the revenue from the young by taxing on the top of the
Laﬀer curve (see Panel (b) of Figure 3).
Figure 4 illustrates the parameter conditions derived in Propositions 1 and 2. The
next proposition summarizes the results established so far. The proof of the proposition
is immediate from Figure 4.
Proposition 3
(i) If ¯ < (1=´)(´ ¡ 1=2)2, there exists a unique poor-majority equilibrium as in Propo-
sition 1(i).
(ii) If (1=´)(´ ¡ 1=2)2 · ¯ < (´ ¡ 1=2)2=(1 ¡ ´), the equilibrium is indeterminate.
There exist both a poor-majority equilibrium, as in Proposition 1(i), and a set of
rich-majority equilibria, as in Proposition 1(ii).
(iii) If ¯ > 1¡2´ and ¯ ¸ (´¡1=2)2=(1¡´), there exists a set of rich-majority equilibria,
as in Proposition 1(ii).
(iv) If ¯ · 1 ¡ 2´; there exists a unique rich-majority equilibrium, as in Proposition 2.
By assuming the cost function of education with ´ = 1, Hassler et al. (2007) focused
on a special case and showed only two patterns of political equilibria, as in Propositions
3(i) and 3(ii). Contrary to their analysis, however, we focus on a wider range of ´ by
assuming a generalized cost function. Under this extended framework, we can derive an
additional two patterns of political equilibria, as in Propositions 3(iii) and 3(iv), which
were not shown by Hassler et al. (2007).
The mechanism behind our main ﬁnding is intuitive and can be understood as follows.
Suppose that the investment cost is low such that ´ · 1. In this case, it is more attractive
for agents to invest in education. In particular, when the cost is suﬃciently low such that
¯ ¸ (´¡1=2)2=(1¡´); agents have an incentive to invest in education even if they expect
a high future tax rate and, thus, a low return from the investment. Then, it becomes
possible to tax heavily the young without compromising the future political equilibrium.
Therefore, in this case, there is a future majority of rich irrespective of the policy involved.
4 Empirical Implications
The equilibrium level of redistribution diﬀers across political equilibria. Consider ﬁrst
the case of a high ´; say ´high; that leads to multiple equilibria, as in Proposition 3(ii).
As already shown by Hassler et al. (2007), this case provides an explanation for the
cross-country diﬀerences in the size of the government and the distributions of the rich
and the poor. To provide an empirical viewpoint, we take the graduation rate of ter-
tiary education as a proxy variable of the size of the rich e¤. Then, the poor-majority
equilibrium corresponds to some continental European countries such as Austria, France,
Germany, and Italy, featured by large government sizes and low graduation rates; the rich-
majority equilibrium corresponds to Australia, Iceland, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and
the United States, featured by small government sizes and high graduation rates (OECD,
2005, 2007).
6Although this case can describe the diﬀerences between some OECD countries, it does
not ﬁt the empirical fact of the Nordic countries; which have large government sizes and
high graduation rates (OECD, 2005, 2007). However, the case of a low ´; say ´low(< ´high);
that leads to only a rich-majority equilibrium, as in Propositions 3(iii) and 3(iv), can
provide an explanation for the Nordic countries. In this case, the majority is rich, and
the level of redistribution is given by 2st = (1 ¡ µ + ¯)2=2´low or 2st = (1 + ¯)2=8´low,
which is generally larger than that in the poor-majority equilibrium, 2st = 3=8´high. In
addition, this equilibrium is persistent in the sense that there is no possibility of shifting
toward a poor-majority equilibrium. Therefore, by focusing on educational costs, we can
show the equilibrium that ﬁts the empirical fact of the Nordic countries, which was not
shown by Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler et al. (2007).
We have shown the existence of the equilibrium featured by a population with a
highly educated majority and a high level of redistribution by considering the cases of
low education costs. The existence of a qualitatively similar equilibrium may be shown
by allowing the wage of the successful agents, w, to diﬀer from unity (Hassler et al.,
2003). A higher wage inequality results in a unique equilibrium where the majority of
rich prefer a large size of government and imposes a high tax rate on the young. However,
this case does not ﬁt the empirical fact of the Nordic countries that are featured by low
inequality (Bj¨ orklund et al., 2002). Therefore, focusing on education costs rather than
wage inequality is a key to explaining the empirical fact of the Nordic countries in the
framework of Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler et al. (2007). Low costs of education can
be interpreted as easy access to tertiary education, which is featured by low university
tuition fees in the Nordic countries.
75 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Suppose that, at time t, agents know that ¿
y
t = 1=2 and expect that ¿o
t+1 = 1. Then,
1 ¡ e¤(1=2;1) = ut+1 = 1 ¡ 1=4´ = 1 ¡ (1=4)(1=´): Because the condition ¯ < (´ ¡
1=2)2=(1 ¡ ´) ensures that ´ > 1=2 (see Figure 4), ut+1 = 1 ¡ (1=4)(1=´) > 1=2 holds for
all t. By (3), this implies that ¿o
t+1 = 1, fulﬁlling initial expectations. Therefore, there
exists a high-tax equilibrium if the decisive voter ﬁnds it optimal to set ¿
y
t = 1=2.
To establish that setting ¿
y
t = 1=2 is optimal for the decisive voter, we note the
following properties of the function Z: (i) Z(¿
y
t ;0) is concave in ¿
y
t and is maximized at
¿
y
t = (1 + ¯)=2; (ii) Z(¿
y
t ;0) > Z(¿
y
t ;1). Given these properties, we derive the conditions
that (i) setting ¿
y
t = (1+¯)=2 is not available under the expectation ¿o
t+1 = 0; (ii) Z(¿
y
t ;0)
is maximized at ¿
y
t = µ; and (iii) Z(µ;0) < Z(1=2;1) hold. These conditions are given by
(i) (1+¯)=2 · 1¡´, (ii) µ 2 (max(0;1¡´);(1+¯)=2), and (iii) µ < ˜ µ(¯), respectively. The
second and third conditions require that µ is set within the range (max(0;1 ¡ ´); ˜ µ(¯)):
The condition ¯ < (´ ¡1=2)2=(1¡´), which guarantees that the set (max(0;1¡´); ˜ µ(¯))
is not empty, includes the ﬁrst condition, as illustrated in Figure 4. ¥





t )) = 0, and U(¿
y
t ) = (2´ ¡ (1 + ¯) + ¿
y
t )=2´. Consequently, the relevant payoﬀ
function in the range ¿
y
t · µ is Z(¿
y
t ;0). The function Z(¿
y
t ;0) is a hump-shaped function
of ¿
y
t ; with a maximum at (1 + ¯)=2.
Given the ﬁrst assumption ¯ > 1 ¡ 2´, i.e., 1 ¡ ´ < (1 + ¯)=2, we can consider the
following two cases: (a) the case of 1 ¡ ´ < (1 + ¯)=2 < 1 + ¯ ¡ ´; and (b) the case of
1+¯ ¡´ · (1+ ¯)=2. In case (a), Z(¿
y
t ;0) is increasing in the range ¿
y
t < (1+¯)=2 and
decreasing in the range ¿
y
t ¸ (1 + ¯)=2. In case (b), Z(¿
y
t ;0) is increasing in the range
¿
y
t < 1+¯¡´. Therefore, the decisive voters prefer ¿
y
t = µ 2 (1¡´;min(1+¯¡´;(1+¯)=2)]
to any ¿
y
t < µ under the assumption of ¯ > 1 ¡ 2´.
An alternative option for the decisive voter is to set ¿
y
t = 1=2 under the expectation
of ¿o
t+1 = 1. The choice of ¿
y
t = µ under the expectation of ¿o
t+1 = 0 is sustained as an
equilibrium if Z(µ;0) ¸ Z(1=2;1); i.e., if µ ¸ ˜ µ(¯); where:
˜ µ(¯) ´








Therefore, there exists a set of low-tax equilibria featured by T o(ut) is given by (3), T y = µ
and U is given by (6) if µ is set within the range:
³
max(1 ¡ ´; ˜ µ(¯));min((1 + ¯)=2;1 + ¯ ¡ ´)
i
:
The condition ¯ ¸ (1=´)(´ ¡ 1=2)2, which is rewritten as ˜ µ(¯) · 1 + ¯ ¡ ´; implies that
the above range is not empty. ¥
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that, in period t, agents know that ¿
y
t = (1 + ¯)=2 and expect that ¿o
t+1 = 0.
Then ut+1 = 1 ¡ e¤((1 + ¯)=2;0) = (2´ ¡ (1 + ¯)=2) · 1=2 if and only if ¯ ¸ ¡1 + 2´.
8The condition ¯ ¸ ¡1+2´ holds under the assumption of ¯ · 1¡2´ (see Figure 4). By
(3), the condition ut+1 · 1=2 implies that ¿o
t+1 = 0, fulﬁlling initial expectations. Given
that Z(¿
y








t ;0) = (1 + ¯)=2, setting
¿
y
t = (1 + ¯)=2 is optimal for the decisive voter.
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(a) The case of 1 + ¯ < ´ (b) The case of 1 < ´ · 1 + ¯
(c) The case of ¯ < ´ · 1 (d) The case of ´ · ¯
1 ¡´ + ¯
Figure 1: The ﬁgures represent the equilibrium decision rule ut+1 = U(¿
y
t ). The solid
lines show the graphs of U satisfying equilibrium condition 2. The panel (a) illustrates
the case of 1 + ¯ < ´; the panel (b) illustrates the case of 1 < ´ · 1 + ¯; the panel (c)
illustrates the case of ¯ < ´ · 1; the panel (d) illustrates the case of ´ · ¯.
10U(¿y
t ) = 1
2´(2´ ¡ 1 + ¿y
t )
U(¿y
t ) = 1




1 ¡ ´ + ¯;1
´
Figure 2: The ﬁgure illustrates an example of a monotonic function U for the case of
´ · 1.
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2 1 ¡´ min
³









2 1 ¡´ min
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Figure 3: The solid curves illustrate the available tax revenue from the young, Z. The
panel (a) represents the case of ¯ > 1¡2´, i.e., 1¡´ < (1+¯)=2. The panel (b) represents























¯ = 1¡ 2´ ¯ = ¡1+ 2´
1
Figure 4: The ﬁgure displays the set of parameters (¯;´) classiﬁed according to the
characterization of political equilibrium in Propositions 1 and 2. The areas (i), (ii), (iii)
and (iv) satisfy the parameter conditions given in Proposition 3 (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv),
respectively.
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